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ABSTRACT 
Cloud  computing  is  rapidly  evolving  due  to  its  efficient  characteristics  such  as  cost-effectiveness, 
availability and elasticity. Healthcare organizations and consumers lose control when they outsource their 
sensitive data and computing resources to a third party Cloud Service Provider (CSP), which may raise 
security  and  privacy  concerns  related  to  data  loss  and  misuse  appealing  threats.  Lack  of  consumers’ 
knowledge about their data storage location may lead to violating rules and regulations of Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) that can cost them huge penalty. Fear of data breach by internal 
or external hackers may decrease consumers’ trust in adopting cloud computing and benefiting from its 
promising features. We designed a HealthcareTrusted Cloud Computing (HTCC) framework that maintains 
security, privacy and considers HIPAA regulations. HTCC framework deploys Trusted Computing Group 
(TCG)  technologies  such  as  Trusted  Platform  Module  (TPM),  Trusted  Software  Stack  (TSS),  virtual 
Trusted Platform Module (vTPM), Trusted Network Connect (TNC) and Self Encrypting Drives (SEDs). 
We emphasize on using strong multi-factor authentication access control mechanisms and strict security 
controls,  as  well  as  encryption  for  data  at  storage,  in-transit  and  while  process.  We  contributed  in 
customizing a cloud Service Level Agreement (SLA) by considering healthcare requirements. HTCC was 
evaluated by comparing with previous researchers’ work and conducting survey from experts. Results were 
satisfactory and showed acceptance of the framework. We aim that our proposed framework will assist in 
optimizing trust on cloud computing to be adopted in healthcare sector. 
 
Keywords: Cloud Computing, HIPAA, Security, Privacy, Trust 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Healthcare users are now demanding higher level of 
IT  interaction  such  as  instant  online  access  to 
information, products and services through their mobile 
devices.  Healthcare  organizations  are  struggling  to 
manage the complexity, cost and effort when upgrading 
their  IT  infrastructure,  purchasing  new  hardware  and 
software,  as  well  as  licencing  and  maintenance  of  their 
existing devices and applications. Cloud computing offers 
significant benefits for healthcare sector such as scalability, 
resiliency, adaptability, connectivity and virtualization and 
optimized  performance.  Cloud  has  high  potential  to 
maximize the efficiency and quality of healthcare services 
through its various service delivery and deployment models 
(Wu  et  al.,  2012),  (Zhang  and  Liu,  2010).  Despite  the 
advantages of cloud computing for healthcare, still there 
are several obstacles related to security, privacy and trust 
that restricts its full adoption (Servos, 2012), (Mori, 2011), 
(Khatua et al., 2011). Consumers lose control when they 
outsource their data and computing resources to cloud with 
no knowledge of data storage location and accessing person 
from the CSP side which may alternatively lead to HIPAA 
violation (Popovic and Hocenski, 2010).  Moreover,  multi-
tenancy feature of cloud can raise the probability of one 
healthcare organization’s data can be  stored at the same 
server as their competitors. This requires strong isolation 
techniques beside robust authentication and authorization 
methods to preserve privacy and prevent any illegal access 
to their data (Takahashi et al., 2012).  Mervat Adib Bamiah et al. / Journal of Computer Science 10 (2): 240-250, 2014 
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2. RELATED WORK 
Several  researches  have  been  proposed  to  deploy 
cloud  computing  in  healthcare  sector.    Some  of  these 
proposals  did  not  implement  any  security  mechanisms 
such as  (Vazhenin, 2012), (Zhou et al., 2011), (Ratnam 
and Dominic, 2012) which can open the way for internal 
and  external  threats  and  may  cause  severe  damage  to 
organizations reputation besides misuse of data. While, 
researchers  such  as  (Narayan et al., 2010), (Narayanan 
and Gunes, 2011) implemented strong access controls but 
did not apply any trusted secure hardware mechanisms. 
Some researchers such as (Li et al., 2013), (Alshehri et al., 
2012)  provided  only  data  encryption  techniques  to 
preserve  privacy  but  their  techniques  was  not  adequate 
enough to secure cloud infrastructure.  
Other  researchers  relied  on  trusted  middleware  to 
achieve integrity and confidentiality i.e., (Abbadi et al., 
2011) but did not provide any security for physical cloud 
infrastructure.  Lohr  et  al.  (2010)  proposed  secure  E-
Health  Cloud  which  provides  a  security  architecture 
based on Trusted Virtual Domains (TVDs) for privacy as 
well  as  the  usage  of  TPM  for  creating  chain  of  trust. 
However,  E-Health  Cloud  architecture  did  not  provide 
data  encryption  or  any  security  technique  for 
middleware. After conducting in- depth literature review 
we found out that there are security and privacy issues 
that are not well covered by the current solutions. These 
issues will be considered in research framework design. 
3. FRAMEWORK DESIGN 
Healthcare sectors’ trust can be achieved when they 
are  confident  that  their  data  is  secured,  available  and 
under  their  control  with  known  data  storage  location 
(Fan, 2012), (Ko et al., 2011). 
Cloud computing facilitates healthcare organizations 
and  indeviduals  three  service  delivery  models  in  form 
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), Platform as a Service 
(PaaS)  and  Software  as  a  Service  (SaaS)  according  to 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
(Mell and Grance, 2011). 
Cloud infrastructure is composed of physical, virtual, 
applications and data resources that have to be secured 
against internal and external threats to protect them from 
unauthorized access to the servers, storage and Virtual 
Machines  (VMs)  (Metri  and  Sarote,  2011).  By 
considering healthcare requirements, we propose secure 
by design layered architecture as shown in Fig. 1. 
3.1. Physical Layer  
Physical  layer  consists  of  servers,  storage,  network 
components and their interaction (Abbadi et al., 2011). 
Its resources are consolidated to serve the virtual layer. 
For  securing  this  layer  we  designed  Trusted  Platform 
(TP) a computing platform that has trusted hardware and 
software  components  which  are  used  to  create  a 
foundation of trust for software processes based on TCG 
specifications  that  includes  its  operation  and  storage 
rules  (Basit,  2009).  Physical  layer  security  can  be 
achieved by securing its components as follows: 
3.1.1. Server Security 
To secure cloud servers from unauthorized access and 
tampering, we use TPM a microcontroller hardware root 
of  trust  that  is  capable  of  secure  key  management, 
storage  and  reporting  of  platform  configuration 
measurements. It allows the identification of users and 
devices which facilitate dual-level authentication for more 
optimized security (Berger, 2012). TPM ensures that the 
system is booted into a Trusted Operating System (TOS) 
which  adheres  to  specified  security  policies  and  strong 
isolation to protect the system from being compromised 
after it has been booted and to prevent applications from 
tampering with each other. 
TPM is installed inside each processing platform in 
the cloud. It facilitates remote attestation to certify the 
authenticity  of  hardware  and  software  being  run  by  a 
remote party (Celesti et al., 2011). TPM and its software 
TSS checks what is installed on each dsevice and verifies 
the  device’s  health  and  proper  performance.  By  using 
TPM capabilities such as authentication, encryption and 
attestation ensures that cloud servers are secured against 
tampering (Achemlal et al., 2011). 
3.1.2. Network Security 
Secure communication requires both the identity and 
state of the remote system to be identified and accepted 
on the same server (Harris and Hill, 2011). In HTCC, 
network is secured by TNC that detects malicious attack 
and  acts  by  restricting  access  to  a  device  or  server.  It 
enables Cloud Service Administrators (CSAs) to control 
the  network  access  based  on  user  identity  and  device 
health  while observing the performance on the  network 
and responding immediately to issues as they occur. TNC 
provides  strong  user  authentication  and  blocks  any 
unauthorized or malicious access. It can include various 
devices  such  as  IP  phones  and  printers  as  well  as 
coordinating security devices across the organization. Mervat Adib Bamiah et al. / Journal of Computer Science 10 (2): 240-250, 2014 
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Fig. 1. Healthcare trusted cloud computing framework 
 
By implementing TNC on CSP network, strong security 
will  be  added  which  will  protect  the  communication 
channel and end points. This will facilitate healthcare sector 
to  use  smart  devices  such  as  mobiles  and  sensors  for 
collecting  and  sharing  information  between  healthcare 
professionals and patients via SaaS model (TCG, 2012). 
3.1.3. Storage Security 
CSPs must ensure that healthcare data are encrypted 
and  stored  in  safe  storage  to  maintain  security  and 
privacy. In HTCC, cloud storages are secured by SEDs 
full-disk encryption hardware that moves the processing 
overhead  of  decryption  and  encryption  to  the  Central 
Processing Unit (CPU) providing encryption protection 
without  impacting  performance.  SEDs  have  all  data, 
applications  and  drivers  encrypted  internally,  also  key 
management is an integral part of the design. SEDs have 
unified,  standards-based  key  management  within  the 
drive controller. Encryption algorithms are based on the 
NIST FIPS 197- AES standards including AES-128 and 
AES-256  that  secures  against  side  channel  leak 
vulnerabilities  and  associated  exploits.  For  providing 
data availability to  healthcare, backup  servers are also 
secured by TPM and SEDs (TCG, 2013).  
3.2.Virtual Layer 
In  HTCC,  virtual  layer  represents  the  virtual 
resources  that  host  consumer’s  applications.  It 
consists  of  VMs,  hypervisor,  virtual  network  and 
virtual  storage  (Abbadi  et  al.,  2011).  In  order  to 
secure  this  layer  we  utilized  vTPM  which  simulates 
the interface and functionality of TPM and enables it’s 
related  TSS  and  other  applications  functionality  for 
VMs.  The  integration  of  TCG  technologies  into 
virtualized  cloud  environments  enables  the  hardware-
based  protection  of  critical  data  and  the  detection  of 
malicious software. For mitigating the security concerns 
of  virtualization  techniques,  we  base  our  solution  on 
NIST SP 800-125 guidelines (Scarfone et al., 2011) that 
recommends securing all elements of full virtualization. 
     Optional  secure  virtualization  techniques  also  is 
provided  in  HTCC  such  as  Trusted  Virtual  Domains 
(TVDs)  over  an  encrypted  Virtual  Private  Network 
(VPN)  that  provides  an  IPSec  point-to-point  secure 
encrypted  communication  channel  between  the 
consumers  network  and  cloud  datacenter  and  is 
decrypted upon receipt at either end points (Jones, 2012). 
VPN  is  established  in  cloud  environment  for  the 
consumer account as shown in Fig. 2. A single private 
Virtual  Local  Area  Networks  (VLAN)  is  allocated  for 
the account that provides an additional layer of network 
isolation  for  VMs  that  are  assigned  to  it  (Vernier  and 
Jones, 2011). The VMs are not visible from the Internet 
but  can  only  be  accessed  either  via  the  VPN  or  via 
another VM on the VLAN. 
3.2.1. Virtual Machine Security 
 In  HTCC,  TPM  provides  hardware-based 
verification  of  hypervisor  and  VM  integrity.  Every 
vTPM is associated with its VM and is provisioned with 
IP  network  addresses  that  are  accessible  through  the 
Internet. This will allow the applications in the VM to 
use  the  vTPM  for  secure  storage  and  reporting 
platform  integrity.  VMs  and  cloud  servers  use  the 
same OSs and web applications as physical servers. Mervat Adib Bamiah et al. / Journal of Computer Science 10 (2): 240-250, 2014 
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Fig. 2. Isolating healthcare data via VPN 
 
By  deploying  vTPM  on  VMs  shields  newly 
discovered  vulnerabilities  in  their  applications  and 
OSs to protect against VMs exploits (Buecker et al., 
2013). We implement stringent security controls such 
Intrusion  Detection  and  Prevention  Systems  (IDPS), 
next  generation  firewalls,  integrity  monitoring,  log 
inspection,  malware  protection,  encryption  and  data 
control  on  VMs  to  increase  the  safety,  protection  and 
maintain compliance integrity of servers and applications 
as  virtual  resources  move  from  on-premise  to  public 
cloud environments (Mell and Scarfone, 2012). 
3.2.2. Hypervisor Security 
Hypervisor  manages  and  control  the  VMs,  if 
attackers managed to take control over the hypervisor, 
they will gain full control over VMs and consumers data 
within  the  hypervisor’s  territory.  Virtual  infrastructure 
relies on the security of the virtualization management 
system that controls the hypervisor and allows the VMs 
administrator  to  start  and  create  new  VMs,  besides 
performing  other  actions  which  may  lead  to  insider 
threats that can access VMs and exploit the data. 
We implemented resilient security controls on the 
hypervisor  by  restricting  the  accessibility  only  to 
authorized administrators with least privileges. More 
over, we deployed virtual Firewall (vFirewall), anti-
viruses  and  virtualization  aware  malware  protection 
that leverages hypervisor introspection APIs to secure 
both  active  and  inactive  VMs  by  performing  full 
system  scans  from  separate  scanning  VMs  and 
defending  against  viruses,  spyware,  Trojans.  In 
addition  to  incorporating  clean  up  capabilities  to 
remove malicious code and repair any system damage 
caused by the malware (Micro, 2010). 
3.3. Application Layer 
This layer consists of cloud consumer's applications, 
which  are  hosted  using  resources  in  the  virtual  layer 
(Abbadi et al., 2011). The CSP must ensure that these 
applications are free from bugs and cannot be used as a 
tool to launch attacks. Securing the application layer is 
about  ensuring  that  healthcare  security  and  privacy 
requirements  are  maintained  by  the  environment 
surrounding  the  application  which  includes  robust 
security controls described as follows: Applications are 
free from bugs and cannot be used as a tool to launch 
attacks. Securing the application layer is about ensuring 
that  healthcare  security  and  privacy  requirements  are 
maintained  by  the  environment  surrounding  the 
application  which  includes  robust  security  controls 
described as follows: 
·  Implementing  strong  security  password  technique 
that will make it hard for the attacker to access the 
consumer's account as discussed in 3.3.1 
·  Securing  the  access  to  the  cloud  application  with 
robust  least  privilege  access  control  methods  as 
discussed in 3.3.2 
·  Encrypting and securing consumer's data during its 
life cycle besides securing it in safe storage by using 
TCG-SED technology as discussed in 3.3.3 
·  Securing the communication channel between the 
cloud server and the consumer by using SSL/TLS 
over HTTPS that ensures all communications are 
encrypted  and  protected  from  interception. 
HTTPS  guaranties  a  lightweight  security  for 
interfacing  with  several  numbers  of  medical 
software and EHRs Mervat Adib Bamiah et al. / Journal of Computer Science 10 (2): 240-250, 2014 
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·  Deploying  security  controls  such  as,  firewall, 
antivirus  protection  and  the  latest  OSs  and  Web 
browser updates 
·  Securing the cloud physical infrastructure with TPM 
and TNC as discussed in 3.1 
·  Securing the cloud virtual infrastructure with vTPM 
and related security controls as discussed in 3.2 
·  Guaranteeing  disaster  recovery  plan  and  secure 
encrypted  data  backup  under  the  regulations  and 
compliance of the consumer's location 
·  Ensuring that the applications are running and data  
is stored at pre-agreed geographical location 
·  Ensuring  efficient  SLA  that  guarantees  security, 
privacy,  availability,  scalability,  performance  and 
compliance with HIPAA 
·  Ensuring that the applications are safe and accurate 
as to not to have any vulnerability to attack 
·  Ensuring  that  applications  are  udated  and  patched 
regulary to protect from zero-day attacks 
 
3.3.1. Username and Password Policy 
Weak Passwords raise vital safety issues for healthcare 
organizations and patients. For-example,  weak passwords 
are vulnerable to hackers who can access patients’ devices 
to  increase  or  decrease  their  drug  dosage.  We    have 
designed strong security control policies for using, storing 
and retrieving username and password described as follows: 
·  Consumer  must  enter  valid  username  that  can  be 
email or name 
·  Consumer must enter a valid password that should 
be hard to detect. It has to be alphanumeric which 
includes capital and small letters, as well as numbers 
and special symbols with minimum amount of eight 
characteristics (e.g., Example12#) 
·  Number  of  attempts  trying  to  input  username  and 
password is restricted to three times else block and 
send  notification  by  email  and  mobile  phone  for 
verification 
Passwords must be encrypted and stored in form of 
transparent color and hashes to protect it from malicious 
access as shown in Table 1.  
 
Table 1. Cloud user 
Id.  Username  Password 
01  example@yahoo.com  ######### 
     
 
3.3.2. Identity and Access Management 
There  are  various  forms  of  Identity  and  Access 
Management  (IAM)  scenarios  in  HTCC  framework  to 
ensure  access  controls  and  authenticated  user  privileges 
from consumer’s side and from CSP’s side. This is vital to 
initiate trust and to protect from malicious access threats. 
In HTCC we emphasis on utilizing industry standard 
IAM  protocols  such  as  Service  Provisioning  Markup 
Language  (SPML)  that  promotes  automation  of  user 
identity  provisioning  and  Security  Assertion  Markup 
Language (SAML) which provides federated Single Sign-
On (SSO) which allows multiple systems for distributed 
access  control  while  maintaining  the  confidentiality  of 
user credentials without needing to remember a load of 
different passwords (Krishnan and Chatterjee, 2012).  
We  propose  multi-factor  authentication  access 
control  technique  since  strong  user  authentication  and 
authorization have not yet been extended into the cloud 
(Choudhury et al., 2011). As for authorization privileges, 
when consumers subscribe to cloud services, they send 
their data and associated access control policies (if any) 
that grants CSP data access rights, such as read, write 
and  copy.  Fig.  3  illustrates  HTCC  authentication 
scenarios of three users as follows. 
3.1.1.1. Cloud Service Provider Authentication 
When CSA reach his office or datacenter he cannot 
access  unless  he  performs  and  pass  biometric  access 
control such as (Fingerprint, Iris Scan, Voice Print): 
·  If  he  passes  biometric  scanning  successfully  then 
CSA has to enter access card for identity verification 
and time stamping 
For  robust  security  we  assume  that  CSP  place  is 
secured with CCTV camera and security guards: 
·  Next CSA use his mobile device to sign-in with his 
username and password according to HTCC policy 
·  If CSA fails to input valid username or password, 
then he is granted three opportunities to correct it, 
else  enter  forgot  username/password  and  a  reset 
instruction will be sent to his email 
·  If CSA passes entering his username and password 
then he must answer the challenge question. If he 
pass  answering  the  question  then  he  needs  to 
authinticate through mobile One Time Pin (OTP) 
·  If  he  fails  to  enter  correct  OTP  then  system  will 
deny access, block user and report incident. It will 
also report IP address for auditing purposes 
·  If CSA successfully entered the OTP code then he is 
granted access to the system. 
Transparent, Encrypted Mervat Adib Bamiah et al. / Journal of Computer Science 10 (2): 240-250, 2014 
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Fig. 3. HTCC people authentication 
 
      However,  for  robust  security  and  to  illuminate 
internal threat, CSA has to choose the right domain for 
authorization access policy and enters his real name and 
identification or employee number: 
 
·  If his name and identification is correct then he will 
be granted access to the system 
·  If he fail then deny access and document the logging 
attempt for later analysis and auditing purposes 
 
3.1.1.2. Doctor Authentication 
Another scenario is from healthcare organization, a 
working  doctor  needs  to  access  a  patient  record.  He 
opens  the  HTCC-SaaS  web  portal  and  signs-in  by 
providing his username and password which complies 
with HTCC policy terms for more robust security. The 
system  will  verify  and  validate  the  username  and 
password.  If  doctor  fails  to  put  valid  username  and 
password,  then  he  will  be  granted  three  chances  to 
correct  it,  else  he  has  to  click  on  forgot  username 
and/or password and a reset instruction will be sent to 
his email, in which he will be verified by a challenge 
question and OTP on his mobile phone or by email. If 
doctor  pass  the  process  of  entering  username  and 
password successfully then he must answer a challenge 
question. If answer is correct then an OTP will be sent 
to  his  mobile  phone  for  further  verification.  If 
successful  code  input  then  proceed  to  access  the 
requested domain and enter doctor id and name. After 
that  doctor  has  chosen  the  domain,  system  will 
authorize  him  the  access  privilege  according  to  the 
organization’s  policy.  If  doctor  does  not  meet  the 
domain  policy,  then  he  is  denied  access,  else  he  can 
access the patient's record. 
3.1.1.3. Patient /User Authentication 
A  patient  is  registering  to  the  cloud,  accessing, 
using  cloud  applications  and  storing  his  data  from 
various devices (sensors attached to his body, mobile) 
and from different places (home, office, car).  Patient 
opens SaaS web portal and signs-in by providing his 
username  and  password  which  is  according  to  our 
design terms for more robust security. The system will 
verify and validate the username and password if not 
accurate, patient will be given three chances to enter 
the right one else he click on forgot username and/or 
password  and  a  reset  instruction  will  be  sent  to  his 
email  for  new  password  generated  which  will  be 
verified  by  challenge  question  and  OTP  on  doctor 
mobile  phone,  if  successfully  pass  then  grant 
access,else deny access and report logging and IP in 
the  system  for  mapping  the  failed  registration  and 
keeping records for auditing purpose. 
3.3.3. Securing HTCC Data Life Cycle  
In HTCC, data is encrypted while in transfer, use, 
share, store and backup as well as in archive phase to 
protect  healthcare  data  from  breach,  misuse  or 
malicious  access.  We  contributed  in  extending  the 
work of (CSA, 2011)  by adding backup in data life 
cycle  as  shown  in  Fig.  4.  Data  backup  is  used  to 
restore data if it is lost, corrupted or destroyed. 
Data backups guaranties availability and continuity 
of consumers’ data within high-speed copy and restores 
to minimize the impact of failures. While data archive 
is performed to effectively manage data for retention, 
long-term access and retrieval (Livens, 2013). 
3.4. Middleware Security 
In HTCC, middleware refers to a set of software 
that  executes  between  OS  and  applications  that 
facilitate  unified  interface,  scalable  and  transparent 
abilities  forinfrastructure  as  well  as  management 
services (Abbadi, 2011). Middleware will be secured 
using the same security techniques as the application 
layer stated in 3.3. Mervat Adib Bamiah et al. / Journal of Computer Science 10 (2): 240-250, 2014 
 
246  Science Publications
 
JCS 
 
 
Fig. 4. HTCC cloud data life cycle 
 
4. COMPLIANCE WITH HIPAA 
HIPAA requires maintaining the privacy of Personal 
Health  Information  (PHI)  to  protect  individual,  public 
health and wellbeing (HHS, 2013). In order for HTCC to 
comply  with  HIPAA  privacy  and  security  rules,    it 
conducted the following procedures: 
·  Documentation and periodic refining of policies and 
procedures to comply with regulation 
·  In emergency access to patients information has to 
be activated using “break-glass” access procedures. 
However, this access is logged and documented for 
auditing purposes and only accessed by authorized 
people identified for these situations 
·  Data is encrypted at rest, in-process and transmit for 
privacy and protect it from leakage and misuse 
·  Providing  physical  and  technical  safe  guards  in 
terms  of  multiple  layers  of  protection  to  assist  in 
keeping  healthcare  data  secure  against  breach  and 
attacks 
·  Limiting and monitoring access to consumers data 
as well as maintaining logs of activity 
·  Implementing  robust  access  control  multi-factor 
authentication mechanism 
·  Deploying  TCG  technologies,  firewall,  anti-virus, 
malware and IDPS systems 
·  Employing  industry  best  practices  for  installation, 
configuration  and  patch  installation  of  managed 
servers and associated devices 
·  Transmitting  healthcare  data  via  SSL/TLS  over 
HTTPS  that  ensures  that  all  communications  are 
encrypted and protected from interception 
·  Providing  availability  and  data  recovery  through 
backups that are stated in SLA 
5. HTCC SERVICE LEVEL 
AGREEMENT 
Regarding to Hon et al. (2012) there is no specific 
tailored  SLA  and  privacy  audits  for  healthcare  sector 
which may raise the risk of non-compliance when storing 
and  processing  medical  and  patient  information  in  the 
cloud.  Our  main  contribution  is  proposing  an  addition 
context  to  SLA  according  to  healthcare  requirements 
such  as  data  location,  level  of  security  and  isolation 
needed  for  virtualized  and/or  physical  resource.  Also 
data deleting, retrieving and auditing processes, besides 
data backups and exit plan to ensure smooth transition of 
accurate complete data and proof of deletion of all data 
after transition is done.  SLA should protect the right of 
consumers  from  each  perspective  to  assure  them  that 
their  privacy  is  preserved  and  their  data  is  securely 
encrypted and governed in all its life cycle, also defining 
the e-discovery policies and  disaster recovery plans  to 
maintain  data  availability  for  best  business  practices. 
Penalties for violating the SLA from both sides have to 
be specified as well as termination terms and conditions. 
In our design CSP must provide prove of regulatory and 
compliance. Since healthcare sector maintain critical data 
and applications. CSP must be transparent and proactive in 
notifying consumers when there is a breach in SLA terms. 
This  includes  infrastructure  issues  like  outages  and 
performance  problems  and  security  incidents.  CSP  must 
keep his certificates up to date for maintaining his reliability 
and reputation (Rodrigues, 2012), (Myerson, 2013).  
Security  and  trust  requirements  in  the  cloud 
environment  such as data availability, data encryption, 
data  integrity  checks,  detailed  access  log,  personnel 
background  checks,  data  failure  and  disaster 
management,  accurate  working  security  policy,  should 
be strictly included in the SLA and to be met during the 
period of a contract as requirements for some countries. 
Moreover, intellectual property must be clearly defined 
and protected in the SLA that the CSP will not use the 
consumers’  data  for  his  own  purposes  (Lehman  and 
Vajpayee, 2011), (Schnjakin et al., 2010). 
6. EVALUATION AND RESULTS  
HTCC  framework    was  evaluated  by  conducting  a 
survey  from  experts  in  information  security  for  cloud 
computing  and  healthcare  as  shown  in  Fig.  5.    75%  of 
experts agreed on the usage of TPM, TNC and SEDs for 
securing the physical layer.  Mervat Adib Bamiah et al. / Journal of Computer Science 10 (2): 240-250, 2014 
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Fig. 5. HTCC framework security survey 
 
While, 81% of respondents have agreed on the usage of 
security controls such as firewall, Anti-Malware, Anti-Virus 
and IDPS and vTPM for securing the virtualization layer. 
Moreover, 78% agreed on the usage of  IAM that involves 
strong  password  and  username  policy  beside  encrypting 
data  and  backup  for  securing  application  layer.  Overall 
rsults  shows  majority  acceptance  of  HTCC  security 
mechanisms which can optimize healthcare sector trust to 
deploy cloud computing. 
7. DISCUSSION 
After comparison with related work and conducting 
the survey we found out that our framework is trusted to 
be  used  in  Health  sector.  In  HTCC  we  proposed  the 
following  contributions  that  aim  to  fulfill  the  gaps  of 
previous researcher’s solutions such as: 
 
·  Contribution 1: Proposing a trust definition based on 
(Fan,  2012),  (Ko  et  al.,  2011)  which  states  that 
trust  can  be  achieved  when  consumers  are 
confident that their data and computing resources 
are safe, available and under their control at known 
location  under  appropriate  SLA  which  preserves 
their rights for auditability and the required level of 
security and privacy 
·  Contribution 2: TCG technologies was deployed for 
optimized  security,  privacy,  interoperability  and 
enhanced performance 
·  Contribution  3:  An  addition  context  to  SLA  was 
proposed according to Healthcare requirements 
·  Contribution 4: HTCC complies with HIPAA data 
security and privacy requirements 
·  Contribution  5:  Separating  data  back  up  as  an 
important stage that must be included for securing 
the  data  availability  and  disaster  recovery.  Also 
encrypting data by default during its life cycle 
·  Contribution 6: Adding storing policy for password. 
·  Contribution 7: Offering multi-factor authentication 
with least privileges for robust access controls 
8. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE 
DIRECTIONS 
We  have  critically  analyzed  the  current 
implementation of cloud computing in healthcare. We 
found out that there is no current solution that secures 
whole cloud infrastructure and comply with healthcare 
rules and regulations. Also there was no SLA that is 
specifically  customized  for  healthcare  requirements. 
We  have  designed  a  trusted  cloud  computing 
framework  that  covers  physical,  virtualization  and Mervat Adib Bamiah et al. / Journal of Computer Science 10 (2): 240-250, 2014 
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application layers security, as well as access control 
mechanisms and data privacy considering HIPAA, in 
addition  to  providing  a  customized  SLA  for 
healthcare. Our aim is to provide security, privacy and 
availability  for  consumers.  Due  to  the  limitation  of 
resources  we  did  not  implement  our  design.  Future 
direction  of  this  research  focuses  on  simulating  and 
implementing HTCC in healthcare sector. 
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